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Abstract. IP telephony is less confined than traditional PSTN tele-
phony. As a consequence, it is more exposed to security attacks. These
attacks are specific to VoIP protocols such as SPIT, or are inherited from
the IP layer such as ARP poisoning. Protection mechanisms are often
available, but they may seriously impact on the quality of service of such
critical environments. We propose to exploit and automate risk manage-
ment methods and techniques for VoIP infrastructures. Our objective is
to dynamically adapt the exposure of a VoIP network with regard to
the attack potentiality while minimizing the impact for the service. This
paper describes the challenges of risk management for VoIP, our runtime
strategy for assessing and treating risks, preliminary results and future
work.
1 Introduction and challenges
Voice over IP (VoIP) defines a new paradigm for telephony services. It permits to
transmit telephony communications directly over IP networks at a low cost and
with a higher flexibility than traditional PSTN1 telephony. It relies on an infras-
tructure composed of VoIP phones, IPBX servers for establishing and managing
call sessions, and VoIP gateways for interconnecting with the PSTN. It exploits
dedicated protocols including signaling protocols such as SIP2 or H.323, and
transport protocols such as RTP or RTCP. However, VoIP communications are
less confined, and then are more exposed to security attacks. They are concerned
by security attacks inherited from the IP layer such as poisoning and flooding
attacks, and also by VoIP-specific attacks such as SIP spoofing and SPIT3 [1].
Moreover, security mechanisms may significantly deteriorate the quality and us-
ability of these services. Typically, the application of encryption, filtering and
authentication techniques may seriously increase delays and loads of VoIP com-
munications.
Risk management provides new opportunities for dealing with these security
issues in such critical environments. It can be defined as a process which consists
1 Public Switch Telephony Network
2 Session Initiation Protocol
3 Spam Over IP Telephony
in assessing risks and treating them, i.e. taking steps in order to minimize them
to an acceptable level [2]. Existing work related to risk assessment in VoIP infras-
tructures includes approaches for assessing threats (defender viewpoint) such as
honeypot architectures and intrusion detection systems based on signatures, or
based on anomalies [3, 4]. They also include approaches for assessing vulnerabil-
ities (attacker side) such as fuzzing-based discovery and auditing/benchmarking
tools [5]. Risk models supporting this assessment may be qualitative (based
on linguistic scales), quantitative (based on probabilities) or mixed (based on
aggregations of qualitative parameters) [6]. Existing work on risk treatments
permit to eliminate risks (risk avoidance) by applying best practices, to reduce
and mitigate them (risk optimization) by deploying protection and prevention
systems [7], to ensure against them (risk transfert) by subscribing an insurance
contract or to accept them (risk retention) [8].
When we look further at these approaches proposed for VoIP networks and
services, we can clearly observe that most of them do not really address risk
management. They usually do not integrate any risk model, or at least not
explicitly, and they only cover partially the risk management process. There is
therefore a serious need for applying risk management in these environments in
order to protect them efficiently, while maintaining their quality of service.
2 Runtime risk management for VoIP
We propose to investigate risk management methods and techniques for VoIP
infrastructures. In particular, we are interested in automating risk management
at runtime: the objective is to dynamically adapt the exposure of the VoIP
network and its components with respect to the potentiality of attacks. This
automation aims at reinforcing the coupling between the risk assessment phase
and the risk treatment phase. The exposure is continuously controlled based
on the activation and the deactivation of countermeasures (or safeguards). A
countermeasure permits to reduce the performance of a security attack, but it
may also deteriorate the service by introducing additional delays or reducing the
access to some specific features. In that context, we have extended the rheostat
runtime risk model [9] to VoIP environments. Let consider a security attack
noted a ∈ A with A defining the set of potential VoIP attacks. Risk is typically
defined as the combination of the potentiality P (a) of the related threat, the
exposure E(a) of the VoIP infrastructure, and the consequence C(a) on that
infrastructure if the attack succeeds (see Equation 1).
R =
∑
a∈A
P (a)× E(a)× C(a) (1)
Rheostat exploits a risk reduction algorithm and a risk relaxation algorithm. The
risk reduction algorithm permits to reduce the risk level when the potentiality
P (a) of the threat is high, by activating security safeguards (such as passwords
and turing tests). This activation reduces the exposure E(a) of the infrastructure,
and then permits to decrease the risk level to an acceptable value. The risk
relaxation algorithm permits to minimize the impact on the infrastructure by
deactivating security safeguards when the risk level is low. We have evaluated
this risk model and specified several safeguards for specific VoIP attacks in [10].
We are generalizing this work to multiple VoIP security attacks.
Fig. 1. Runtime risk management for VoIP environments
We have also specified a functional architecture for supporting runtime risk
management in these environments, as depicted on Figure 1. This architecture
is composed of an intrusion detection system responsible for detecting threats
in the VoIP platform, a risk manager for managing risks and selecting security
safeguards with respect to a given context, and a configuration server for dy-
namically activating or deactivating the security safeguards. We are determining
several strategies for deploying this architecture on a VoIP infrastructure.
3 Preliminary results
We have developed a first implementation of the risk manager component and
have evaluated its behavior based on a set of experiments. We have focused on
SPIT attacks and have considered two main scenarios: a first one correspond-
ing to the case when the threat potentiality increases over time (risk reduction
algorithm), and a second one corresponding to the case when the potentiality
decreases (risk relaxation algorithm). We have shown the capability of the risk
manager to reduce risks due to VoIP attacks and to minimize costs induced by
safeguards. We have also shown the benefits and limits of our approach in com-
parison with traditional strategies. Our runtime solution permits to mitigate the
risk level (benefits of up to 41%) and to maintain the continuity of the VoIP ser-
vice in an dynamic manner. The benefits are limited in the case of instantaneous
VoIP attacks. We are performing additional and complementary experiments of
this schema based on Monte-Carlo simulations.
4 Conclusions and perspectives
Telephony over IP has known a large-scale deployment. VoIP communications
are less confined than in traditional telephony, and are exposed to multiple at-
tacks. Security mechanisms are required for protecting these communications.
Their application may however seriously deteriorate the performances of such a
critical service: a VoIP communication becomes incomprehensible as soon as the
delay is more than 150 ms, or the packet loss is more than 5%. In that context,
we propose to exploit and automate risk management methods and techniques
at runtime in VoIP networks and services. Our aim is to dynamically adapt the
exposure of the VoIP infrastructure based on a set of security safeguards in or-
der to provide a graduated and progressive answer to risks. We have exploited
the rheostat risk management model, specified a functional architecture, and
evaluated the case scenario of SPIT attacks. We are extending this approach
to multiple VoIP attacks, and are quantifying the impact of parameters based
on Monte-Carlo simulations. For future work we are planning to evaluate sev-
eral configurations for deploying our functional architecture, and will investigate
return-on-experience mechanisms for automatically configuring and refining the
risk model parameters.
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